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Reproducing Political Capitalism in the 






 The article examines a decade of changes in the media after the collapse of the so-
cialist system in East-Central Europe. Several structural tendencies in the ECE coun-
tries may be identified which are, in different degrees, spread throughout the region 
and reflect the imitative nature of the new systems. It is argued that the imitative na-
ture of the newly emerging systems is an almost unmanageable obstacle to the devel-
opment of more democratic systems in the region. The imitative tendencies are clus-
tered in two broader groups: (1) those imitating external environment, primarily 
Western Europe and the USA, which comprise Italianization; denationalization and 
privatization; commercialization, and inter- or transnationalization; and (2) those 
“imitating the past”, i.e. the former system of state socialism: renationalization, and 
nationalistic and religious exclusivism. In addition to the domination of unilateral 
imitation, the greatest impediment to the progress in media democratization represents 
an immense increase in lawsuits against journalists and the media, in which journal-
ists are often found guilty of libel and offence and severely fined or even imprisoned. 
Consequently, the developments in the ECE countries led to the establishment of a 
kind of “political capitalism” and created a system of “paternalist commercialism” in 
the media, with the state (government) often acting both as a powerful political and 
economic actor. 
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The Rise of Political Capitalism 
 
 We may use the term “political capitalism” to denote the form of transition from 
the former socialist system to a new (quasi)capitalist system in the East-Central Euro-
pean (ECE) countries as a transformation from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, in Tön-
nies’ terms (1887/1991). Essentially this means that still no clear differentiation be-
tween the state and the market, and between political parties and civil society exists. It 
is a type of transition that Tönnies would relate to two opposed forms of property: “the 
property of an organic will” typical of Gemeinschaft and “the property of a reflexive 
will” that predominates in Gesellschaft. The reflexive will’s property, brought about 
by the “commercial civilization,” is considered an “expense” and is essentially nothing 
but a means for the people to reach a desired end (i.e. profit). However, the organic 
will’s property, which is prevalent in a less developed social structure, is “irrationally” 
assimilated by the subject (owner, e.g. the state), so that there is no clear separation of 
means and ends of human or state actions. 
 Clearly, the market place alone or in combination with political (party) pluralism 
does not guarantee equality in freedom since market forces can both expand and 
reduce the democratic potentials of the media. The market is essentially a terrain for 
different policies and coalitions – based on different ideologies – but media systems 
are established, maintained and eventually abolished by political decisions. In the 
former socialist countries, however, the state often acts both as a political and 
economic actor. It is unavoidable that a state that rigidly controls the economy cannot 
tolerate the kind of political competition that independent media would represent. Yet, 
as the state is also the safeguard of civil society, it ought to perform its duties and 
establish a regulatory framework of the media to serve democracy. In practice, 
however, institutions of civil society and public opinion are still marginalized. While 
the absence of a market economy makes the media politically dependent, the opposite 
does not hold true: a market economy cannot guarantee political autonomy media. The 
developments in the ECE countries led to the establishment of a kind of “political 
capitalism” and created a system of “paternalist commercialism” in the media.  
 The question of how to advance the democratization of communication and media 
– often raised both in administrative discourse and academic analysis – primarily ap-
plies to media regulation, but no to state intervention into the media. Rather, media 
regulation involves a number of competing interests in addition to the interests of the 
three branches of state power. At least five distinct classes of interest in the mass media 
could be identified: (1) media owners’ interest in using their media as a means of self-ex-
pression and profit maximization; (2) the general interest of capital to advertise com-
modities on an ever larger scale; (3) demand from audiences for media uses; recipients’ 
interest in receiving information and opinions; (4) various civil society groups’ interest in 
having access to the media to publish their opinions; (5) a general interest in maintaining 
the rights of all citizens and in the media performing their public service functions. Strik-
ing a proper balance between different actors is the fundamental problem of regula-
tion. For instance, the idea of media democratization in the framework of press free-
dom has been confronted from the very beginning particularly by those who advocate 
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the free market as the most efficient regulatory system. The contemporary develop-
ment of satellite television and global computer mediated communication networks is 
accompanied by a legal vacuum – or at least vagueness – regarding legal regulation. It 
seems that these problems and conflicting interests stimulate the tendency of global-
izing the market-type regulation. It certainly produces the least legal uncertainties, but 
at the same time – and with no less certainty – (definitely) buries the idea of public 
service media, which are fundamental to the 20th-century notion of democratic com-
munication. 
 
Lessons from Post-Communist Countries 
 
 With the breakdown of authoritarian structures in East-Central Europe in the late 
1980s, the idea of an active public is rooted in political transformations as an intellec-
tual motive and practical goal. The media had, and still have, an important role in the 
historic battle for democracy and pluralism in the region in at least three senses: (1) In a 
number of former socialist countries, the media were agents of revolutionary political 
changes of the 1980s. (2) At the same time, in all East-Central European countries, revo-
lutionary changes in society were aimed at the transformation of the party- or state-owned 
media. (3) Finally, in one way or another, all the central questions of transition of these 
societies pertain to the media: the role of the state and civil society, the question of de-
mocratic pluralism, problems of denationalization and privatization of the means of pro-
duction, the quest for sovereignty and, of course, the liberalization of the media systems 
themselves. In the 1990s, all countries in the region privatized the press and introduced 
a form of dual (“public-commercial”) broadcasting system. Soon after the early period 
of strong political dependence of the broadcasting sector on the new political élites, 
radio and television take the path of commercialization characterized by cheap studio 
programs and talk shows, increasing re-runs and, particularly, increasing foreign 
(mainly US) entertainment. The withering away of the idea of a (new) public sphere in 
the region is caused by a combination of internal commercial pressures (e.g., techno-
logical underdevelopment, economic problems) and external influences (e.g., TV sta-
tions controlled or directly owned by transnational corporations, like SBS and CME). 
 Before democratic (r)evolutions, fundamental reforms in the institutions of 
communication, particularly in broadcasting, were considered by civil movements 
essential for any process of democratization. Yet, after systemic changes, many of East-
Central European state broadcast organizations remained essentially unchanged or even 
re-regulated as typical state institutions by the newly established political élites. While the 
post-Communist governments liberalized the print media immediately, they slowed down 
the de-etatization of state radio and television in order to control powerful media and 
propagate their ideas to an increasingly disenchanted society. Everywhere, television was 
the most “attractive” choice. Thus, it happened that a part of the former “anti-state” 
intellectual opposition came once again in the position to require public “protection” of 
the media against party and/or state interference. 
 Compared with the situation prevailing before 1989, the media in Central-Eastern 
Europe have certainly noted significant gains in their liberalization and pluralization. 
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However, in contrast to demonopolization, which has made decisive progress, other 
fundamental prerequisites of media democratization – e.g., media differentiation, 
professionalization of journalists, access to the media – are far from being materialized. 
State monopoly was abolished everywhere, but politicians in all countries tend to 
constrain journalistic freedom by using or introducing anti-defamation laws to penalize 
journalists for writing openly about public officials and institutions. Particularly in the 
former Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, and several former Yugoslav republics, poor 
economic conditions, the lack of a developed advertising market, continuing monopolies 
(e.g., of press distribution) and a considerable degree of state control (with subsidies and 
content-based criteria for registration of newspapers) leave little room for a truly 
independent press. Democratization is also impeded by slow progress in the 
professionalization of journalists, understood both in the sense of highly developed 
individual skills and competence, and in the sense of collective professionalization in 
which journalists perform public service and develop professional organization to enforce 
the service ideal and to protect the autonomy of the profession.  
 In almost all the former Communist countries, a broadcasting law providing for 
demonopolization and the introduction of the private sector has been adopted. However, 
demonopolization does not equal differentiation of the media and democratization of the 
communication sphere. Both the ruling coalitions and the oppositional parties, as well as 
the Catholic Church, still tend to see (particularly public broadcast) media as a corporate 
“democratic” organ of the new “pluralist” party-state, i.e., in the same perspective as they 
were regarded by the former authorities. This old authoritarian conception of the total 
polity practiced for decades by the old socialist regimes may be found in other activities 
as well, for example in controlling nominations of chief personnel in educational, cultural 
and health institutions, or in wooing intellectuals to become party members or prophets. 
 Censorship has been legally abolished in all former socialist countries in Eastern 
Europe, but not yet the state control of broadcasting. Although the new media laws are 
generally (but with some exceptions) more liberal than the old ones, they still have 
loopholes that offer governments the opportunity to influence the media and journalists. 
The need to re-regulate broadcasting was widely recognized, particularly in terms of 
creating procedures for granting licenses to new private/commercial broadcasters, but the 
process of developing new law was politically contentious and therefore protracted. There 
were also genuine constitutional difficulties with the institutional arrangements for 
regulating and controlling public and private broadcasting which widely reflected a 
country's system of government. 
 Communist media systems were based on secondary content regulation that was 
expected to limit the flaws and “side effects” of media markets (e.g., different forms of 
publications or, generally, information subsidies), although market economy does not 
exist in the sphere of communication. That is probably the main reason for the com-
plete disappearance of secondary regulation during the re-regulation period in the 
1990s, because it is considered a form of state intervention like in the former system. 
Consequently, even public media are not liberated from competition for (advertising) 
income; neither are they politically independent and protected against particularistic 
(political) interests. Mass media remain vulnerable to manipulation by political forces 
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and, in addition, became dependent on commercial corporations, which limit re-
sources, variety, and autonomy. It is obvious that the media are not inevitably instru-
mental to democracy; they are no less effective as instruments of manipulation. The 
cumulative effects of the development of a free market economy and a general eco-
nomic underdevelopment do not stimulate “media differentiation, professionalization of 
journalists, demonopolization, decentralization, a degree of democratization,” as Jaku-
bowicz (1995) describes the fundamental prerequisites for media change in East-Cen-
tral Europe. The underdeveloped economy is impeding the deployment of new infor-
mation and communication technologies for computer mediated communication and 
the Internet, i.e., in sectors left to private initiative and commercial interests like the 
de-nationalized press. Even the denationalization of broadcasting – which resulted in a 
dual broadcasting system – turned into a paradoxical negation of the development of 
public service media.  
 It is difficult or even impossible to generalize validly the main tendencies in the de-
velopment of the press and broadcasting during the last ten years in the countries so 
diverse as, for example, Russia and the Czech Republic, or Rumania and Slovenia. 
Nevertheless, several tendencies may be identified which are present, in different de-
grees, throughout the region. Seven of them are, I would argue, particularly important 
in sustaining “political capitalism” in the media: (1) renationalization; (2) Italianiza-
tion; (3) denationalization and privatization; (4) commercialization; (5) inter- and 
transnationalization; (6) nationalistic and religious exclusivism, and (7) criminal 




 In almost all countries in the region, the new governments did not hesitate to use 
regulations and strategies of the former regimes to retain control over national 
broadcasting – either a direct control by appointments of boards, directors and editors, or 
a more indirect control over the budget and other economic instruments (e.g., state 
advertising). In some countries, as for example in some former Yugoslav republics, the 
former broadcasting acts have been changed to (re)establish the control of the state over 
radio and television organizations. While in the former self-management system, the right 
to participate in appointments to managing and editorial positions in the media was 
granted to media workers, the amended broadcasting acts in all Yugoslav republics have 
abolished this workers' right and made it a privilege of either the government (e.g., in 
Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Croatia) or the parliament (Bosnia and Herzegovina). In 
Slovenia, this right of media employees was reintroduced in 1994, after a four-year 
interruption, but abolished again five years later. 
 The media have been largely used as the battleground of party élites tending to maxi-
mize their political power and to change the political map. Not surprisingly, broadcasting 
is still largely organized in accordance with the former “collectivist” ideology and the 
dominant role of the party-state, and its restructuring aimed at establishing a national, 
politicized and (quasi) commercial “public” broadcasting subordinated to state authorities 
and party élites rather than to public accountability. Political parties, parliaments or even 
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governments usually act as the only representative of “the public,” thus having the right, 
for example, to appoint both the board and directors and editors of broadcasting compa-
nies. Although the new systems differ from the former ones in that these functions were 
transferred from the Communist Party to the democratically elected state organs, this does 
not change the fundamental dependence of the media on external political authorities, and 
the reduction of the public to the masses of passive consumers. New forms of broadcast-
ing regulation in East-Central Europe are apparently borrowed from the West-Euro-
pean countries. However, access to the “public” broadcasting is either still severely 
limited to political élites in most countries of the region – in some countries even only 
to those of the ruling coalitions – or commercially based. Broadcasting councils as the 
main regulatory bodies are, as a rule, appointed by parliaments or (partly) even by 
governments. This also applies to supervisory bodies of public broadcasters. In both 
cases, civic associations, societies, and movements have no access to the institutional 
forms of media management and control. 
 The strike by journalists and media workers at Czech Public Television in Prague 
in December 2000 – ten years after the "velvet revolution" – was "a moment of truth" 
for media democratization not only in the Czech Republic, but also in the entire region 
of post-communist countries. Journalists demanded from the Czech authorities to re-
move Jiri Hodac, the newly-appointed General Director of Czech Public Television 
and former close adviser to Vaclav Klaus, the President of the Parliament and Leader 
of the ODS, the conservative Democratic Citizens Party, and to reform the television 
council, which was under total control by political parties. Hodac has tried to purge the 
editorial department and dismiss key leaders of the management, who rebelled over his 
new regime and asked him to resign. He responded by dismissing four of them. The 
journalists' anger over political interference reached breaking point with the appoint-
ment of Jana Bobosikova, another former close adviser to Klaus, to head the political 
department at the station. She immediately fired 20 editorial staff, which led to the 
newsroom revolt. Almost all countries in the region experienced similar attempts by 
governments and political parties of political dealing and complete disregard for the 
principles of editorial independence during the last decade, but the Prague strike was 
the first to get tens of thousands of citizens to rally in support of media freedom. 
 
Italianization of the Media 
 
 Large parts of the broadcasting systems in East-Central Europe were re-nationalized 
and put under a direct or indirect control by the leading political parties. I call this 
process “italianization” of the media, because it is almost a mirror image of what 
happened for decades in Italy until the partitocratic political system crashed in 1992. 
The emerging media systems in East-Central Europe are similar to the Italian system in 
the 1980s as characterized by Mancini (1991: 139): (1) The media are under strong state 
control, either directly, as in the case of state-owned television, or indirectly through 
various forms of state-owned and/or economically supported press. (2) The degree of 
mass media partisanship is strong; the political parties have always been involved in 
editorial choices and the structure of the mass media. (3) Equally strong is the degree of 
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integration of the media and political élites; for example, there is a strong professional 
mobility between the worlds of politics and journalism. (4) There is no consolidated and 
shared professional ethics among media professionals. In addition, post-socialist media 
are in a similar position to those in Italy in the 1980s because of the instability of political 
systems, which represent a kind of “coalitional complex” consisting of a large number of 
parliamentary parties or single “great coalitions”. Unlike in Italy, however, the media 
landscape in East-Central Europe is much less differentiated and pluralistic, and the 
commercial – particularly broadcast – sector is far less developed, which is related both to 
the transitional nature of the ruling political coalitions and to the general economic crisis. 
Nevertheless, the Italian model of a rapid and largely unregulated development of private 
television of Berlusconi may serve as a warning: not only because of its strict commercial 
orientation, which – as in other Western countries – challenged the traditional quality 
orientation of public television, but also because of its final de facto politicization, when 
Berlusconi's party wan parliamentary elections in 1993. 
 
De-nationalization and Privatization 
 
 After decades of state-controlled media, it was largely believed that freedom of 
ownership and particularly private ownership is the guarantor of democracy and a free 
press. Privatization was seen as the only instrument that can reduce and possibly abol-
ish state intervention in the media. In practice, the disentanglement of state property 
and its conversion into private property has been intensely political. 
 During the early post-Communist period, one of the most significant characteristics 
of ownership changes in the press was the elimination of the previous dominant role of 
the state. Practically all newspapers and some local radio stations were privatized, and 
a number of new, privately owned and commercially oriented radio and television sta-
tions were set up. East Central European countries have widely embraced liberal-plu-
ralist economic and political models. Here, press freedom is equated with private own-
ership by individuals, and the market is seen as the surest safeguard against state inter-
ference. But in practice, governments did not withdraw completely and the press 
throughout the region is still heavily saturated with politics. Besides intervening 
through media and cultural policies, some degree of direct or latent state ownership 
could be still found in many print media sectors. The case in point represent recent ef-
forts by the Hungarian government to use public money to establish a right-centrist 
newspaper. Similarly, the first Slovenian post-Communist government financed the 
establishment of a privately owned conservative daily, the owners being primarily 
party officials. The licensing of new broadcasting stations was often much more a 
party-political decision than the result of (or at least attempts at) identifying the needs 
and interests of publics, e.g., through public hearings, as practiced in some Western 
countries rather than based on the selection of the most appropriate (or highest) bidder. 
As Vartanova (1999) argues, “the long-standing authoritarian tradition of state pres-
sures over the Russian media has marginalized the scope of market activities of inde-
pendent newspapers or TV stations. In recent years state owned and Government run 
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media have got a dominant position at the media market being increasingly used for 
getting political benefits, not revenues.” 
 The licensing of new broadcasting stations was often much more a party-political 
decision than the result of (or at least attempts at) identifying the needs and interests of 
publics, e.g., through public hearings, as practiced in some Western countries rather 
than based on the selection of the most appropriate (or highest) bidder. The media in-
dustry – which was supposed to be subject to regulation – becomes in some countries 
(where it succeeds in acquiring licenses for nation-wide broadcasting, e.g., in the 
Czech Republic) a very powerful partner of political actors, whereas in other countries 
it remains (informally) controlled by political parties. In both cases, such a “partner-
ship” substantially decreases the autonomy and role of regulative bodies. On the other 
hand – and for many reasons – the mass media are likely to provide support for the 
establishment, in general, and government, in particular, primarily to avoid informal or 
formal “inconveniences” related to licenses. The increase of mutual influence between 
political and economic establishments and the media does not allow for a liberal media 
market with a diversified supply of newspapers and broadcast programming as 





 As it is necessary to distinguish between “traditional” re-nationalization and “mod-
ern” Italianization, a distinction should be drawn between privatization and commer-
cialization of the media. Not only private newspapers and radio and television stations 
choose to entertain and satisfy mass demand (and powerful advertisers), in order to in-
crease readership and audience, and hence, profits. Public broadcasters went the same 
way because they are surrounded by private economy, which substantially limits their 
production autonomy (Negt and Kluge, 1973: 191). As a consequence, even public 
service media react to the environment as business companies: for example, the results 
of the measurement of audiences become a sort of “television money” that determines 
the value of programming; they are managed according to the same managing princi-
ples as any other company; and they are directly involved in transactions with private 
(foreign) suppliers of programs and equipment, which are often in a monopoly position. 
 A kind of paternal-commercial media system is emerging, with a tendency of 
privatization and commercialization of the media (particularly the press) on the one 
hand, and of exercising and maximizing political power over the media (television in 
particular) on the other. In many countries in the region with developing market 
economies, the lines between political and business interests are blurred. The competi-
tion for consumers causes competition for the latest news and makes journalists vul-
nerable to politics; political authorities enter journalism either directly through inter-
views and press conferences, or indirectly through “information subsidies” (making in-
formation available to journalists on a quid-pro-quo basis), influence the journalistic 
agenda setting, if not attitudes and actions, and eventually make journalism subsidiary 
to public relations. Tabloid journalism was a “salvation” out of the press of conflicting 
S. Splichal: Reproducing Political Capitalism in the Media of ...  
 13
powers. The blending of facts and opinions, real events and trivial fictional material, 
news and entertainment replaced factual and reliable accounts of daily, particularly 
politically relevant events. This in turn results in an increased number of lawsuits 
against journalists based on the legal provisions that they should not harm the rights to 
privacy and reputation of individuals. 
 
Inter – and Transnationalization 
 
 The state of the economy and the development of the free market are crucial for the 
development of capital-intensive media such as television. In many countries in East-
Central Europe it was argued that without foreign investment into the media it would 
have been impossible to improve newsprint and printing quality, modernize editorial 
offices and, primarily, to establish and equip radio and television stations. Thus, all 
countries in the region made media markets accessible for foreign capital. Post-com-
munist media became increasingly internationalized at five levels: those of reception, 
media contents, funding, regulation and organization, including foreign media owner-
ship (Jakubowicz, 1996). Foreign investments and ownership contributed to move 
away the previously overpoliticized media from direct influence of the state. These re-
sults are perhaps – certainly not always – least dependent on the present party politics. 
In addition to foreign capital, they include the import of Western managerial and pro-
fessional practices in the media operation and a diversification of media products, e.g., 
sorts of magazines, tabloids, and new types of programming.  
 Media internationalization and globalization may have opposing and controversial 
consequences: on the one hand the international circulation of cultural products may 
enrich national cultures if adopted creatively by the local populations, but on the other 
hand it may help to extinguish local cultures. However, in East-Central European the 
consequences of this process are predominantly negative, because all countries in the 
region became merely its “recipients,” but not its actors. In a number of countries in 
the region, for example Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic, more than 50 per cent 
of the national dailies are owned by foreign companies. Thus Fabris (1995) argues that 
the “Westification” of East Central European media has fully progressed and there is a 
good chance that East-Central Europe will become a “supplemental engine for the 
Western European media industry.” The processes of privatization and “colonization” 
of the East by the West could lead to “a stratified press in which the majority of the 
population will be effectively denied access to information about matters of public im-
portance” (Sparks, 1991: 20). 
 
Nationalistic and Religious Exclusivism 
 
 The end of totalitarian rule in East-Central Europe marked a new stage in the proc-
ess of re-creating civic identity. By providing an instantaneous source of “referential 
points,” the media, particularly television which, often emerge at the forefront of the 
processes of the search for self-assertion, both individual and collective. Revolutionary 
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political and economic changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in the dis-
solution of former legitimizing identities and in the construction of new ones. This 
search for new identities is predominantly not based on individual and group points of 
identification which could replace the state-provided and institutionally embedded 
identities, but is again a clearly institutionalized process led by political parties, the 
State and the Catholic Church. The restructuring of identities is often based on the 
“collective rights” doctrine, largely expressed in ethnic and religious terms. New iden-
tities significantly depart from the former ones based on the ideology of “socialist in-
ternationalism,” but they are not really new: in fact, they are a sort of hybrid of past 
and more recent ideological “coalitions” based particularly on the national or ethnic 
pride, religious fervency, historic places of origin, or economic ambitions. These iden-
tities are likely to be used to discriminate among people: speaking “the right” lan-
guage, being part of the dominant ethnicity and religious denomination, may condition 
one’s access to the “national” media and politics in general.  
 
Prosecution of Journalists 
 
 In a number of ECE countries power élites introduced rather “endogenous” strate-
gies of interference with the media, including intimidation and harassment of journal-
ists, and even assassinations are used to silence unwanted voices. Several prominent 
journalists and editors of independent media were assassinated during the last couple 
of years. Even if not the most dreadful, the most widespread and epidemic peril of in-
dependent journalism and the media is an increased number of lawsuits against the 
media based on the legal provisions that journalists should not harm the rights to pri-
vacy and reputation of individuals. The anti-defamation laws do not differentiate be-
tween legally respected intervention into privacy of public personality and the protec-
tion of privacy of other citizens, as it is the practice in democratic countries. Even if 
the liability of journalists is legally restricted to dealing with the individuals who are 
not “public persons,” such provisions are largely misused to discipline journalists. 
Generally, there is almost no risk involved in suing journalists. Libel is considered a 
criminal offence and covered in the Penal Codes. Individual plaintiffs and, in some 
cases (to “protect” the highest state officials), public prosecutors ex officio may file a 
criminal charge against journalists for defamation. Citizens also have the right to sue 
and collect damages according to civil law, with no fee to pay when asking for damages. 
 From a detached perspective, a rapid increase in lawsuits against journalists could 
be primarily considered a necessary and favorable consequence of an increased free-
dom of expression and gradual implementation of new legislative and judiciary poli-
cies toward freedom of the press. Yet this is certainly not the case if defamation is le-
gally treated as criminal offence whose perpetrator could be imprisoned, and which is 
prosecuted ex officio by public prosecutor, as it is the practice in a number of ECE 
countries. Moreover, as Slovak judge Drgonec (in Skolkay, 1999: 1) points out, the 
“evidence of truth” is considered legally irrelevant, “because true information can be 
equally the outcome of illegal intervention into privacy as false information. This re-
sults in lowering of the possibilities of the mass media to apply their control function 
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through public opinion vis-à-vis public personalities.” The possibility of convicting a 
journalist for a probable violation, not caused by falseness, of a public person’s per-
sonal interests may seriously limit freedom of the media. In a situation where the 
plaintiff is a public figure, public official, or even public prosecutor ex officio, “a libel 
action may be a disguised way of preventing the press from performing a checking 
function” even in countries with a much longer democratic tradition (Powe, 1991: 
292). As statistics of judicial decisions in a number of ECE countries indicate, jour-




 During the last ten years, the newly formed states in East-Central Europe mostly 
re-regulated their media systems with varying degrees of efficiency. In fact, the gen-
eral success of these efforts to establish a truly democratic system based on the public 
service sector is very limited. The substantial changes in media legislation mainly con-
cern structural and contents regulation, but they largely failed. Structural regulation 
(media ownership, organization, financing, management, control, procedures for li-
censing, rules for access, etc.) remains ineffective, since legal violations are often not 
prosecuted either for political reasons and/or for a general lack of personnel and tech-
nical means to enforce the respective laws. Contents regulation (what content and how 
should it be selected and presented in programming, including quotas?) did not con-
tribute to increasing quality.  
 There is no doubt that the former centralized socialist economy based on state 
ownership was both economically inefficient and inimical to democracy. But it would 
be also mistaken to believe that free markets and private property are the only (or, at 
least, the best) alternative in both respects. The question of an alternative to laissez-
faire is particularly important for such vital activities in civil society, as are education, 
science, culture, and communication. Although an advocacy of any form of socialized 
markets and social ownership is regarded highly suspiciously in the period of the pro-
claimed laissez-faire doctrine in ECE, it should be acknowledged that the imposition 
of narrow commercial criteria threatens the integrity of civil society and hands the ini-
tiative to greedy commercial interests. 
 The imitative nature of the newly emerging systems is an almost unmanageable 
obstacle to the development of more democratic systems in the region. Imitation, if re-
ciprocal and based on accumulation, i.e. active, may well lead to real changes and in-
novations. Yet the type of imitation practiced in the ECE countries is basically nega-
tive and passive: it is unilateral (only from West to East), and based on substitution 
(revocation of all old institutions and criteria). Uncritical imitation of democratic in-
stitutions developed in older democracies may be a risky business. Instead, as Dahl 
(1991: 15) suggests, the countries in transition to the inauguration of democratic insti-
tutions should “discriminate between the aspects of the mature democratic countries 
that are essential to democracy and those that are not only not essential to it but may 
be harmful.” Such a critical view is particularly needed because in some cases the ex-
tent and forms of privatization of the mass media in ECE exceed what has been prac-
Medij. istraž. (god. 6, br. 1) 2000. (5-17) 
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ticed in Western capitalism, and ECE countries are becoming a kind of experimental 
zone for those strategies of privatization activated by Western media capital, which are 
still held back by the social responsibility doctrine of the media in the West. Western-
type capitalism should not be simply imitated through substitution also because of 
immense cultural differences. 
 The absence of market economy makes the media politically dependent, but the 
opposite does not hold true: a market economy cannot guarantee political autonomy 
media. The developments in the ECE countries led to the establishment of a kind of 
“political capitalism” and created a system of “paternalist commercialism” in the me-
dia, with the state (government) often acting both as a political and economic actor. 
Thus the access to the media is in practice either still severely limited to political élites 
– in some countries even only to those of the ruling coalitions – or commercially 
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 Autor analizira promjene u medijima Srednje i Istočne Europe u desetljeću nakon 
raspada socijalističkog sustava. Uočava nekoliko strukturnih tendencija u tim zemlja-
ma koje su, u različitoj mjeri, prisutne u cijeloj regiji i odražavaju imitativnu narav no-
vih sustava. Po autorovu mišljenju, imitativna priroda novih sustava u nastajanju pred-
stavlja gotovo nesavladivu prepreku u razvoju demokratičnijih sustava u toj regiji. Te 
imitativne tendencije mogu se svrstati u dvije veće skupine: (1) one koje imitiraju 
vanjsko okruženje, prvenstveno Zapadnu Europu i Sjedinjene Američke države, a 
obuhvaćaju talijanizaciju, denacionalizaciju i privatizaciju, komercijalizaciju, te inter- 
i transnacionalizaciju; (2) one koje “imitiraju prošlost”, to jest, bivši sustav državnog 
socijalizma, a zagovaraju renacionalizaciju i nacionalistički i vjerski ekskluzivizam.  
 Pored dominacije jednostranog oponašanja, najveću prepreku napretku u 
demokratizaciji medija predstavlja ogroman porast broja sudskih tužba protiv novinara 
i medijskih kuća zbog klevete. Nerijetko se proglašavaju krivim zbog klevete i uvrede 
časti i osuđuju na visoke globe ili čak na zatvorske kazne. Tako je u zemljama Srednje 
i Istočne Europe uspostavljena jedna vrsta “političkog kapitalizma” i stvoren sustav 
“paternalističkog komercijalizma” u medijima, u kojem se država (vlada) često javlja 
kao moćan politički i ekonomski akter. 
